spotlight europe special edition 2008/06: Irish Vote, Europe's Future: Four options after the "No" by Hierlemann, Dominik.
 
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
#
 
2
0
0
8
/
0
6
 
spotlight europe  
special edition 
# 2008/06 – June 2008 
Irish Vote, Europe’s Future: 
Four options after the “No” 
 
 
Dominik Hierlemann 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, dominik.hierlemann@bertelsmann.de
Ireland has rejected the Treaty of Lisbon. More than six years after the 
start of the constitutional process, the work and effort of the European 
Union seems to have been in vain. The intention was to make the com-
munity more effective and far more democratic. All that remains is a feel-
ing of helplessness. What, if anything, can European policymakers do in 
this situation? 
 
OPTION I 
Repeat the referendum 
and insert a declaration 
In a few months’ time the Irish will hold 
another referendum on the unaltered 
treaty. From a European angle this would 
be the simplest solution, though the least 
likely from an Irish point of view. Hardly 
any of the Irish voters who said “No” in 
the first referendum will have been per-
suaded to change their minds by the time 
the second referendum comes along. Polite 
comments emanating from Brussels that 
all the other member states have already 
given or are about to give their assent to 
the treaty will do little to change this state 
of affairs. 
However, the Treaty of Lisbon in its pre-
sent form could be spruced up by adding a 
special declaration for Ireland. This might 
include a statement repeating the EU’s at-
titude to Ireland’s three “holy cows:” mili-
tary neutrality, abortion and corporate 
taxation. The advantage of such an addi-
tional declaration would be that ratifica-
tion in other EU member states would not 
become invalid, and the treaty would not 
have to be renegotiated. 
 
OPTION II 
A new treaty 
The Treaty of Lisbon is sent back to the 
drawing board and is renegotiated from A 
to Z. The procedure would resemble the 
one which occurred after the referendums 
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in France and the Netherlands. What 
would seem to be the most clear-cut solu-
tion is in fact very risky in political terms 
and could easily end up in a quagmire 
when it comes to defining what the Treaty 
should in fact contain. 
 
The member states which only grudgingly 
gave their assent to the Treaty of Lisbon 
because they were actually expecting a 
greater degree of integration from a new 
treaty would do everything they could to 
prevent even more back-pedalling. 
 
On the other hand there are the United 
Kingdom and the Czech Republic with 
their eurosceptical electorates and/or gov-
ernments. They would prefer a treaty 
based on a completely different strategy 
and might reject any additional steps to-
wards integration. This could be an omi-
nous state of affairs. In the case of Ireland 
it would be compounded by the fact that 
the issues underlying the opposition to the 
treaty were rather vague and for this rea-
son could not be used as the basis of a 
new and consistent negotiating position. 
This option would only be feasible if the 
way in which a new treaty is put to the 
vote were to be changed. The different na-
tional ratification procedures and the at-
tendant possibility of referendums at vari-
ous different times could be supplanted by 
a Europe-wide referendum on the new 
treaty. In this context it might be apposite 
to apply the principle of the dual majority. 
If fifty per cent of the EU electorate and at 
least fifty per cent of the member states 
were in favour of the new treaty, it would 
enter into force. It is conceivable that the 
governments might jointly declare that, 
come what may, they would abide by the 
result of a ballot based on such a proce-
dure. 
 
OPTION III 
Keep Nice and make  
minor alterations 
Is it really true that the European Union 
cannot function on the basis of the Treaty 
of Nice concluded in 2003? There can be  
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no doubt that the European Union has long 
since outgrown the made-to-measure suit 
it was given back in those days. A Union 
with 27 or what may soon be even more 
member states needs different decision-
making mechanisms. Nevertheless, even 
with the Treaty of Nice, which is currently 
the basis on which the Union operates, the 
legislative machinery in Brussels would 
continue to function. Admittedly, the po-
litical will and a determination to get 
things done would be lacking in the years 
to come. How is Europe supposed to assert 
itself in the world at large and in its deal-
ings with other great powers if it cannot 
even do its homework? 
 
Every single amendment of the institu-
tional structure would have to be worked 
out painstakingly between the member 
states and the institutions in Brussels. 
That would be difficult, but not wholly im-
possible. 
 
Thus it would certainly be feasible to set 
up the joint External Action Service and to 
create the office of a European Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. New treaties are not re-
quired in order to do this. What is needed 
is the political will. Steps leading to more 
democracy and co-decision-making by EU 
citizens are also possible. Thus the Euro-
pean Council could declare that it would 
appoint its candidate for the post of Presi-
dent of the Commission only if he or she is 
also being elected by the European Par-
liament. 
And why should a European citizens’ ini-
tiative not be possible even though it is 
not provided for in institutional terms? 
With the help of inter-institutional agree-
ments between the EU bodies or even by 
simply making changes in the procedural 
rules, European policymakers could easily 
demonstrate that they are being serious 
when talking about the advent of more 
democracy in Europe. 
 
OPTION IV 
A supranational Union 
The old EU would continue to exist on the 
basis of the Treaty of Nice, whilst a num- 
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ber of pro-deepening member states would 
establish another Union of their own. The 
threat of a separate European core can cer-
tainly be used in order to exert political 
pressure, but in practice such a new con-
federation would be confronted with nu-
merous problems: 
 
•  Who would participate? E v e n  i n  c o u n -
tries which are repeatedly mentioned as 
possible members of a European core, 
there is little willingness to surrender 
even more sovereignty to a supranational 
level. Neither German nor French citizens 
currently see European integration as the 
one and only solution for their national 
problems. 
 
•  What will happen to transparency? The 
new community would need its own insti-
tutions and its own financial re-
sources. The EU originally wanted 
to become more transparent. This 
would definitely be a thing of the 
past. Citizens would find it very dif-
ficult to understand the new Euro-
pean institutional muddle and the 
need for financial resources. 
 
•  How would the new Union work 
together with the old Union? The 
countries of the new Union would 
constitute a power bloc wielding a 
very large number of votes in the 
old Union. The automatic result 
would be the formation of two com-
peting camps. 
 
•  What would happen to the com-
mon European idea? Only a few 
years after eastern enlargement and 
the panegyrics on the unification of 
Europe the continent would once 
again be on the verge of new divi-
sions and ruptures. The EU would 
once again have failed in its attempt 
to speak to the world with one 
voice. 
 
The ongoing evolution of a project-
based Europe is more probable than 
the establishment of a new Union 
by an exclusive group of member 
states. In various policy areas, 
countries with varying interests will 
team up in a number of different constella-
tions to pool their policymaking.  
“More likely is a  
differentiated Europe.” 
The euro and the Schengen area demon-
strate that variable forms of deeper inte-
gration are not new. Unlike the idea of a 
European core, this kind of evolution 
would not lead to the formation of compet-
ing blocs. Thus the subsequent inclusion 
of other states would be an important con-
stituent feature of this differentiated and 
project-oriented approach. As a result,  
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policymaking in various policy areas could 
proceed without immediately sowing the 
seeds of division and discord in the Euro-
pean Union. 
 
 
Other alternatives are  
interesting, yet  
questionable 
Another alternative, which is already be-
ing aired in the media, is whether and how 
Ireland should and could be forced to leave 
the European Union. European policymak-
ers must reject this scenario swiftly and 
decisively. Even if the Irish “No” vote is a 
bitter setback for the development of 
Europe, it must be treated with respect. 
After the rejection of the constitutional 
treaty by France and the Netherlands, no 
one would have hit on the idea of expel-
ling these countries from the EU. The 
same approach should apply in the case of 
Ireland. Pressing ahead with the Treaty of 
Lisbon without the Irish might be interest-
ing in political terms, though it would be 
democratically questionable and legally 
impossible.  
“The EU’s democratic  
legitimacy would vanish 
into thin air.” 
 
The idea is that the 26 other member 
states would work on the basis of the new 
treaty from January 2009 onwards, and 
that ways and means would be found to 
enable the Irish to join in at a later date. 
In the weeks to come such political threats 
will be uttered on a number of occasions. 
They presuppose that the ratification proc-
ess will continue in the EU member states 
which have still not completed it. Thus at 
the end of the day Ireland may well have 
been the only country in which the treaty 
was rejected. 
 
 
However, in the light of European and in-
ternational law this course of action is 
simply impossible. All signatories to the 
treaty, that is, all 27 EU member states, 
must have ratified the Treaty of Lisbon be-
fore it can enter into force. Furthermore, it 
would reinforce the image of the EU as an 
entity which does what it wants to do with 
or without reference to the electorate. The 
original constitutional process, which was 
designed to make the European Union 
more democratic and bring it closer to-
gether with its citizens, would have been 
turned on its head. The EU’s entire democ-
ratic legitimacy would simply vanish into 
thin air. 
 
 
What needs to be  
done now? 
In the immediate aftermath of the Irish 
“No” vote, European policymakers have 
very little room for manoeuvre. For the 
time being the present draft treaty should 
be retained, since this is in fact the 
backup plan many people are currently 
looking for. The Treaty of Lisbon was the 
answer to the rejection of the European 
constitutional treaty in France and the 
Netherlands. It is a compromise which was 
reached with great difficulty as a result of 
pressure exerted by the German EU presi-
dency, and only to the accompaniment of a 
great deal of loud gnashing of European 
teeth. 
“There is little room for 
manoeuvre.” 
A renewed revision of the treaty would not 
only be difficult to accomplish in political 
terms. With regard to what it contains, it 
would also be moving on difficult terrain. 
What exactly needs to be revised? The 
clash of the various different integration 
policy paradigms–ranging from the idea 
that Europe should grow together as 
closely as possible to the vision of Europe 
as a loose free trade area–would be even  
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more pronounced. At the end of the day 
hardly any of the more substantial 
achievements of the constitutional treaty 
would survive, and the common European 
spirit would cease to be of much impor-
tance. 
 
Thus the heads of state and government 
must send out a clear signal that the rati-
fication process in the last eight member 
states will continue and be completed. 
When all other EU countries have ratified 
it, the Treaty of Lisbon, to which a special 
declaration has been appended, could be 
submitted once again to the Irish elector-
ate. 
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